The middle class wants a government that maintains a level playing field in the economic arena.
answer is, as Aristotle remarked, good politics: it is about the likelihood that governments in developing countries will become not only more capable in the administrative and organizational sense, but more responsive and accountable to their own citizens (and more "democratic") in the political sense. [1] The theory, in short, is that a key benefit of the middle class is a greater likelihood of good politics and good government (what is often called in the development community "good governance") -a benefit that is not inevitable but if the middle class is large enough compared to the poorer and the rich, is more probable than otherwise (Easterly 2001; Loayaza et al., 2012 . The middle class wants good government, and where it is large enough, it is willing to pay taxes to finance public provision of collective goods (Moore, 1998; Alesina, Cozzi, and Mantovan, 2012) . As Wiemann points out, to the middle class is generally attributed "not only a moderating role visàvis political extremists, but also an interest in political democratization, in good and transparent governance, and respect of civil rights." I would add that the middle class wants a government that maintains a level playing field in the economic arena, free of insider rents and privileges, capable of regulating effectively natural monopolies, and able to administer and enforce tax systems adequate to provide security, basic infrastructure, and other public and collective goods and services (Birdsall, 2010) .
The $10 identifier of an "income-secure" middle class What do I mean by an incomesecure middle class? I mean people who are not at risk of becoming poor because of some household shock: sudden unemployment; working capital lost to robbery, abusive police or local tax collectors; loss of an uninsured dwelling to fire or floods; a sick child; a failed crop. A simple proxy identifier of middleclass people in the developing world is those living in households in which daily income per capita is $10 or above (purchasing power parity, 2005, in 2010 US$). In several countries of Latin America, households with per capita income of $7 per person per day have a 20 to 25 percent risk of falling into poverty over four years (LopezCalva and OrtizJuarez, 2011 ); only at $10 per person per day does that risk fall to just 10 percent.
In the discussion below, I use $10 (household per person per day in 2005 purchasing power parity terms) as a crude cutoff to distinguish between households above the $10 threshold, which are likely to be incomesecure and "middle class," and households below $10, which are likely to be "strugglers" or the absolutely poor . The distinction is one that I emphasized in my keynote speech at the 2014 EADI conference in Bonn. [2] It is a critical one to the extent that many references to the rise of the middle class implicitly include the larger number of households in most developing countries which, though not poor, are not middle class either. They probably help increase growth since they represent growing consumer demand, including for local products and services. But they are not yet a secure middle class that thrives on a competitive economic and political system; they are not as likely to be a political force for better government as is the secure middle class.
The $10 a day threshold is useful because it is an absolute measure and therefore permits comparison across countries and over time in the size of the middle class. (An education measure would in principle be better as a proxy for an individual's permanent income, but years of schooling is a poor measure of education, because so much education occurs outside of schooling and because quality of schooling varies so widely.)
At the same time, the $10 threshold is far from precise. Across countries, the minimum necessary daily income to be "incomesecure" is likely to vary. It will be higher where publicly funded social insurance is not available; it is probably higher for the "illegal" or unrecognized migrants to urban areas in China who cannot access free public services. In countries outside Latin America, where household surveys measure consumption, not income, the "right" identifier could be as much as 25 percent lower; in India it might be lower as well if the purchasing power parity adjustment compared to countries of Latin America overstates the cost of living for those at or near $10. [3] Whatever the right threshold, even the "secure" middle class is not immune to a major and prolonged economywide downturn. The middle class in Argentina was hit hard by that country's problems in the 1990s and in the early 2000s, as has been the middle class in Greece, Italy and Spain since 2008 -and some are arguing the middle class in the United States. The distinction is between insecure strugglers living on $10 or less who are vulnerable to householdspecific shocks (many subject to the anxieties that Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013 , argue reduces their "bandwidth" for rational, self interested decisionmaking) and the more secure $10andabove group who are reasonably insured against such shocks. The latter are likely to have private home and health insurance, for example, and access to publicly financed unemployment insurance, in normal times, but in times of extended economywide recessions or the kind of structural changes in the labor market and tax systems that the middle class in the United States has experienced.
#1:
The middle class has to be big enough Table 1 shows the estimated proportion of people in the middle class for selected countries using a minimum of $10 a day as an identifier (and $50 a day or more to identify the "rich"). Overall, the proportion is about 35 percent in Eastern Europe and about 25 percent in East Asia and Latin America. But in Africa and South Asia, the regions where most people live in lowincome countries [4] , the proportion is much lower: less than 5 percent. Among the BRICS, it is about 35 percent in Brazil and could be under 5 percent in India [5] . The $10 a day identifier is meant to separate people in the secure middle class from those in the larger group in the developing world who have escaped poverty defined using the international poverty line of $2 a day (and escaped extreme poverty of $1.25 a day or less), but are not secure from the risk of falling into poverty. Identified (crudely) as those living in households between $4 and $10 per person per day, they are variously referred to as the "strugglers" (by this author), the "vulnerable," the "fragile middle class." sometimes the "lower middle class." [6] In Latin America, they tend to have primary schooling and to work in the informal sector; adults in $10andmore households tend to have secondary schooling and are more likely to be paystub "employees" (Birdsall, 2012) .
A big increase in the numbers of "strugglers" across the developing world (Edward and Sumner, 2014) is widely viewed as a good thing for growth in developing countries. The increase in their numbers is associated with increasing demand for consumer goods (refrigerators, scooters, TVs) and with the potential for developing countries to grow their domestic markets for manufactured goods and reduce their dependence on commodity exports to the advanced economies.
But it is less clear whether the struggler group is good for good government in the manner Aristotle invoked referring to the "middle class." In the past, economically vulnerable urban populations have been associated in Latin America with populism (consider continuing support for Chavez and his successor in Venezuela) (Sachs, 1989) and with a yearning for the order and stability associated with authoritarian governments.
The distinction between the secure middle class and insecure and vulnerable strugglers seems to me important, as imprecise as it is. It does not reflect a difference in values and aspirations (LopezCalva, Rigolini, and Torche, 2012), But it does appear to reflect a difference in political views and demands. [7] The strugglers, who are less secure materially, will be particularly sensitive to policies and political decisions that are costly to them in the short run. [8] The secure middle class will have a longer planning horizon and be better able to focus on public and collective goods: the quality of schooling, health care, and roads.
The struggler group was probably at the heart of protests in Brazil in 2013 that were triggered by an increase in bus fares, which would matter for the $4 to $10 group but not for the secure middle class, who aremore likely to commute by car (Ali and Dadush, 2012) . Members of the middle class no doubt participated because, along with their struggler counterparts, they were unhappy over corruption in politics and high public spending on World Cup soccer stadiums. (Kees Biekart, 2015, describes the Brazil protests in these two stages). In Chile, it is the struggler group that was probably important in protests over rising student debt being accumulated to pay tuition at inferior private colleges and universities. In Tunisia, the Arab Spring was triggered by the attention to one man's dramatic protest (immolating himself) in reaction to police harassment that threatened his livelihood (seizure of his vegetable cart). Mohamed Bouazizi was probably a struggler. [9] In all these cases, the protests were a reaction to specific threats to a group's material wellbeing -though they got traction and became extended, no doubt, because of broader and deeper citizen concerns of over $10 middleincome households. [10] In Hong Kong, in contrast, recent protests reflect more specific and overt resistance to political decisions in themselves-as in Istanbul in 2013 and in the United States during the 1960s civil rights and antiwar movements. In Hong Kong, close to 90 percent of the population lives on $10 a day or more. There as in the United States decades ago, it is more likely that along with students, it has been the secure middle class (and students who expect to join that class) who have dominated protests and protest movements.
Where the secure middle class is small, as in many countries of subSaharan Africa, it is also likely to be more economically dependent on government, either directly in the case of civil servants or indirectly in the case of employees of stateowned banks and other enterprises heavily dependent on government subsidies and political largesse (Birdsall, 2007) . In these settings, middleclass households are more likely to be inside the room than out on the streets and to see their interests aligned not with the poor and strugglers but with the rich. As Baud, 2015, suggests in the case of urban India, the (upper) middle class is more likely, when it does act in civil society organizations, to align itself with the postmaterialist views of the global "cosmopolitan" class (for example in supporting urban beautification); it does not necessarily focus on "prematerialist" (my wording) demands for more widespread access to schooling, mass transportation, and public security that are priorities for the poor and the strugglers.
On the other hand, in middleincome countries where median income is higher and the secure middle class ($10 and above) is large as a proportion of a population, the middle class is in a better position to make demands of government for a level playing field such as businessfriendly policies that encourage competition and elimination of hidden privileges for the crony capitalist elite. It is less likely to see its interests aligned with the "rich" and more likely to constitute willing taxpayers and a beneficent lobby for public goods that benefit everyone, including the below $10 poor and strugglers.
How big is big enough to have some chance of sustaining good government?
The experience of Brazil and Chile, where the proportion of the population living on $10 a day and more had reached 20 percent and 30 percent respectively by 2005 (Birdsall, 2012) and is now above 30 percent and 40 percent respectively, provides a possible example. In those countries the distributional effect of changes in the budget share dedicated to social programs in the 2000s was distinctly redistributional; in those social democratic regimes (where reductions in inequality were greater even than in populist regimes of Latin America over the last two, three decades) changes in the budget shares for social programs benefited the bottom three quintiles of the income distribution, were neutral for the fourth from the bottom quintile, and were negative for the richest top quintile. [11] How did that happen? In Brazil during the Lula presidency, the increase in conditional cash transfers under the Bolsa Família program and in other social spending were not resisted by the secure middle class and may have been supported. Presumably that was in part because the Lula regime also hewed to disciplined macroeconomic policies that were good for growth and business and was, in its early years at least, viewed as reasonably effective in targeting the cash transfers to the truly poor and managing well the increase in social spending.
In contrast, the secure middle class is probably too small still in India, Bangladesh, Kenya, and Senegal to discover and organize its collective interest in a good government in which progrowth and propoor policies are combined (table 1) . Where the middle class is very small and highly dependent on government directly or indirectly, it is more likely to see its interests as aligned with rich insiders than with poor outsiders.
Good government has a better chance of being sustained once a largeenough and secureenough middle class is in place.
I am, in short, optimistic about development prospects in those countries where the $10andabove middle class has already reached 20 to 25 percent of the population. That is a rough guess at a critical threshold, based on Brazil and Chile's experience since the turn of the century, above which a country has a reasonable probability of locking in institutions of goodenough government. (It is not a guarantee. Consider Russia, for example, though even in Russia there is considerable resistance to the current political regime.) In those countries, good government (and all that implies about adequate "institutions") has a better chance of being sustained once a largeenough and secureenough middle class is in place. [12] Table 1 highlights selected large countries in which the middle class is at least 20 percent of the population. [13] Still, that optimism has to be tempered. A large proportion of the developing world's population (about 50 percent and growing as population growth is greater in low income countries, particularly Africa) now lives in countries where less than 20 percent of the population is middle class. Many of these of course are what are labeled "fragile states" in the development community. The middle class is probably too small to be a factor in the demand for good government in those countries for several decades. China, which has a relatively large middle class in urban areas, but a tiny one in rural areas, is likely to see a continued increase in the proportion of middleclass households; even if growth slows dramatically from the 10 percent average over the last 30 years, it is still likely to be on the order of 5 percent or more barring an unforeseen and dramatic disruption, and the middle class is likely to benefit at least proportionately. [14] But India and most other countries of South Asia and subSaharan Africa still have relatively few middleclass people; in those countries those few are in the top 5 to 10 percent of their country distributions (in India 5 percent of the population is over 60 million people); many are likely to benefit from the current economic and political rules of the game, even where those rules are not friendly to competition and growth. Continued and shared growth in these countries depends heavily on one or another contingency: positive external conditions, a wellmanaged naturalresource windfall, or a period of good political leadership without Aristotle's large middle class.
#2. The middle class has to keep getting richer and bigger
Will economic growth persist, and be sufficiently shared within countries, to ensure that the middle class gets richer and bigger in developing countries as a proportion of countries' populations? That requires that countries continue to enjoy economic growth and that the growth they enjoy is sufficiently shared so that it continues to move people out of the struggler group into the middle class over the next several decades.
That is what has happened to visible effect in the last two decades. A now wellknown figure constructed by Branko Milanovic (figure 1 -see Milanovic, 2012) shows the incidence of growth for each percentile of the global distribution of income (in which all people in the world are lined up by their income, independent of their country of residence) for the period 1998-2008. I have imposed on the figure the approximate per person daily income at key points in the curve. What the graph illustrates is that the biggest beneficiaries of growth in that decade, other than the 5 percent or so of the richest people, were the strugglers, namely those in the $4-$10 group. This is the group that moved out of poverty in that decade, as a result of high growth rates especially but not only in China and India. A smaller but significant proportion of the world's population has moved above the $10 line into the incomesecure middle class. Table 2 shows projections of the proportion of countries' (growing) populations that will be in the middle class (using the proxy of $10-$50) in 2030 and in 2050, assuming continued growth and continued sharing of the benefits of growth along the lines of the recent past. [15] The projections reflect countryspecific growth rates over the next 35 years that are reasonably conservative, and they assume for every country that there is no change in the future in their current distributions of income or consumption. [16] They suggest that by 2030 all of today's uppermiddle income countries will have 35 percent or more of their populations in the middle class -all comparable to Brazil today. The increases slow in percentage terms in the subsequent two decades. See also footnotes [20] and [21] In short, continued steady growth of economies over the next several decades would move people up the income ranks from poverty to struggler and from struggler to middle class in many countries, as long as that growth is shared sufficiently to avoid worsening inequality in any country. By 2050 most of today's uppermiddleincome countries could have well over 50 percent of their households in the middle class.
At the same time rapid growth (over 5 percent annually) for another 35 years in lowincome countries like Tanzania and India is not enough to build a middle class that constitutes 20 percent a year even by 2050: only a few, including Egypt, Ethiopia, and urban India and urban Indonesia, will have even 20 percent of their population in the incomesecure middle class, a proportion reached in about 2000, almost 50 years earlier, in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Figure 2 shows projections for India and Mexico. The projections are cause for optimism that government in the broad sense will improve, at least in today's middleincome countries, to the extent that two assumptions are correct: 1) a larger middle class has a greater interest in a responsive and accountable government and greater probability of having its collective interests reflected in political life, and 2) a larger middle class is more likely to support a social contract in which the taxes it pays are largely channeled to collective and public goods from which all, including the strugglers and the poor, benefit.
The question of course is whether the current set of middleclass countries and the emerging set including China, will continue to enjoy the (relatively rapid) growth that most have enjoyed in the last 10 to 15 years (and China and India for at least a decade before 2000).
[17] With, at the time of writing, commodity prices falling as demand from China declines, and Europe (another big market) on the edge of deflation, the growth outlook for many developing countries is not good. However that is the short run. A second question is whether whatever growth there is will be distributed at least as well as it has been in recent years in most developing countries, benefiting the strugglers sufficiently to move them into the middle class. On this issue there is also cause for optimism; if reasonable rates of growth persist, inequality is unlikely to rise and could decline as it has in many countries of Latin America in the last decade (LopezCalva and Lustig, 2013) , so that the trend of the poor moving into the struggler group and the strugglers moving into the middle class will continue.
Of course these are only projections. On the downside is the possibility that the commoditydriven growth of the last decade in Latin America, for example, benefited most those with fewer skills, reducing inequality but discouraging the upgrading of skills that will be needed to fuel continued growth in the future[18]; or the possibility that the second machine age [19] , sometimes associated with robots and their use not only in industry but in personal services, will hurt the middle class in developing as well as in the most advanced economies; or that lowincome countries will make poor use of the naturalresource windfalls many are expecting (Ghana, Uganda, Mongolia, Tanzania, East Timor), leading to deteriorating governance; or that unabated climate change will disrupt growth especially in those countries too far from whatever threshold proportion of middleclass households matters for good government.
A concluding reflection
The projections of the future size of the middle class in developing countries rely on countryspecific growth rates (fixed starting in 2010) over 20 and 40 years, and on the assumption that there will be no change in each country's current distribution of income/consumption over that entire period.
On the key argument of this paper -that the middle class is good for good government -the reader must come along with me on three other key assumptions. The first is that in the developing world there is, at about $10 of household income per person, a "security" line above which people can be called middle class, but below which they cannot; there is at least indicative evidence of such a threshold from several countries in Latin America, but the exact threshold will clearly vary by country.
(The $10 threshold implies that in most developing countries the "middle class" is not anywhere near the middle of the distribution; it is currently crowded mostly in the top quintile, and in lowerincome countries, including India and most countries of Africa, into the top decile or even the top ventile.)
The second assumption is more fundamental. It is that Aristotle's observation was right, namely that it is the materially secure middle class that benefits from good government and thus demands it and helps sustain it by financing public goods (and the regulatory regime and contract enforcement and rule of law and so forth through willing payment of taxes).
The third assumption has to do with what constitutes a middle class "society." I have roughly assumed that it is only when some minimum proportion -at least 20 percent and perhaps closer to 30 percent -of the population is rich enough and materially secure enough to be "middle class" that Aristotle's connection between the middle class and good government becomes more likely and more sustained.
What are the implications? One implication is that today's middleincome countries, assuming reasonable continuing growth and no increase in current inequality, are likely to become more and more middleclass societies in the next two decades, and to enjoy the political and economic stability associated with more democratic, participatory and accountable government. About these countries we can therefore afford to be reasonably optimistic.
But a second implication is that today's lowincome countries, even those that could enjoy another two decades of healthy growth, will not enjoy that benefit. They will continue to need better than average luck and leadership if they are to maintain or build more democratic, accountable, and participatory governments.
A third is that in 2050, there may still be an important divide in the world, between middleclass countries and societies with reasonably sound institutions and good government on the one hand, and countries where institutions are still fragile and most people are, in a material sense, poor on the other. The lottery of birth -the country in which individuals are born -will still matter greatly for
The lottery of birth will still matter greatly for individuals. There will just be more goodluck countries.
individuals (barring dramatic easing of migration barriers). There will just be more goodluck countries from individuals' point of view.
Table A1 (below) shows the assumed average per capita growth rates for the countries in Table 2 . Average GDP per capita growth rates for growth projections
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